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Oliver Gürtler

Oliver Gürtler - Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar

Research focuses

Personnel Economics, Labor Economics, Organization Theory; Key Research Initiative: Behavioral Management Science;

Curriculum vitae

  • Since 2017 Affiliated Professor at the Linnaeus University Centre for Discrimination and Integration Studies
  • 2011-2016 Studies of Mathematics at University of Hagen
  • Since 2009 University Professor at the Department of Economics of University of Cologne
  • 2003 - 2009 Research Assistant at the Chair “Business Administration II” at University of Bonn
  • 2006 - 2009 Habilitation at University of Bonn
  • 2003 - 2006 Doctoral studies at University of Bonn
  • 1998 - 2003  Studies of Economics at University of Bonn

Selected publications

  • Simple equilibria in general contests. Games and Economic Behavior 134 (2022), pp. 264-280 (with Spencer Bastani and Thomas Giebe)
  • Firm Choice and Career Success - Theory and Evidence. European Economic Review 127 (2020), 103470 (with Christian Deutscher, Marc Gürtler and Jed DeVaro)
  • Promotion Signaling, Discrimination, and Positive Discrimination Policies. RAND Journal of Economics 50 (2019), pp. 1004-1027 (with Marc Gürtler)
  • Advertising and Labor Market Matching: A Tour Through the Times.  Journal of Labor Economics 36 (2018), pp. 253-307 (with Jed DeVaro)
  • Strategic Shirking: A Theoretical Analysis of Multitasking and Specialization. International Economic Review  57 (2016), pp. 507-532 (with Jed DeVaro)
  • The Optimality of Heterogeneous Tournaments. Journal of Labor Economics 33 (2015), pp. 1007-1042 (with Marc Gürtler)
  • Sabotage in Contests: A Survey. Public Choice 164 (2015), pp. 135-155 (with Subhasish Modak Chowdhury)
  • Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81 (2012), pp. 403-420 (with Thomas Giebe)
  • Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages and Litigation. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 26 (2010), pp. 337-364 (with Matthias Kräkel)
  • On Sabotage in Collective Tournaments. Journal of Mathematical Economics 44 (2008), pp. 383-393