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Piotr Dworczak

Research focuses

Inequality-aware Market Design, Mechanism Design, Information Design, Financial Over-the-Counter Markets

Contact information

Piotr Dworczak
Department of Economics
Adenauer School of Government

Phone: tba
Email: dworczak.piotr(at)uni-koeln(dot)de
WWW: economics.uni-koeln.de
WWW: asg.uni-koeln.de
Personal Website: www.pdworczak.com

Curriculum vitae

  • Professor of Economics, Adenauer School of Government, University of Cologne, 2026 –
  • Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Northwestern University (on leave), 2026 –
  • Researcher, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw, Poland, 2020 –
  • Associate Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Northwestern University, 2022 – 2026
  • Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Northwestern University, 2018 – 2022
  • Saieh Family Fellow in Economics, Becker Friedman Institute, University of Chicago, 2017 – 2018
  • Ph.D. Economic Analysis and Policy, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, 2012 – 2017
  • B.A. Mathematics, University of Warsaw, 2009 – 2012
  • B.A. Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, 2008 – 2011

Awards & Honors

  • Andrzej Malawski Award for young scientists (for achievements in mathematical economics), 2024
  • Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellow in Economics, 2022 – 2024
  • Second-place Fama-DFA award, 2021
  • Amundi Smith Breeden First Prize, 2017
  • Review of Economic Studies Tour, 2017

Selected publications

  • An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization (with M. Akbarpour, E. Budish, and S. D. Kominers), Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 139, Issue 1, February 2024
  • Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms (with M. Akbarpour and S. D. Kominers), Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 132, Number 6, June 2024
  • Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion (with A. Pavan), Econometrica, Vol. 90, Issue 5, September 2022
  • Redistribution through Markets (with M. Akbarpour and S. D. Kominers), Econometrica, Vol. 89, No. 4, July 2021
  • Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms, Econometrica, Vol. 88, No. 6, November 2020
  • The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion (with G. Martini), Journal of Political Economy (lead article), Vol. 127, No. 5, October 2019