Auction theory and practice, design of auction-based markets (communications, electricity, and financial markets)
- Since 2018 Professor of Economics, University of Cologne
- Since 1996 Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, University of Maryland. Since 2008 Affiliate, Agriculture and Resource Economics
- 1993 - 1996 Associate Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, University of Maryland
- 1992 - 1993 National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
- 1988 - 1993 Associate Professor of Economics and Management, Yale School of Management, Yale University
- 1984 - 1988 Assistant Professor of Decision Theory, Yale School of Management, Yale University
- 1984 Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
- Dissertation- The Role of Time and Information in Bargaining
- 1980 Bachelor of Science with distinction, School of Operations Research and Industrial Engineering, Cornell University
- "Global Carbon Pricing—The Path to Climate Cooperation" (with David JC MacKay, Axel Ockenfels and Steven Stoft), MIT Press, 2017.
- "The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response", (with Eric Budish and John Shim), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130:4, 1547–1621, November 2015.
- "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions", (with Lawrence M. Ausubel, Marek Pycia, Marzena Rostek, and Marek Weretka) Review of Economic Studies, 81:4, 1366-1400, 2014.
- Combinatorial Auctions, (with Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg) MIT Press, 2006.
- "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data", (with Joseph S. Tracy) American Economic Review, 82, 100–121, 1992.
- "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty", Review of Economic Studies, 59, 205–225, 1992.
- "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently", (with Robert Gibbons and Paul Klemperer) Econometrica, 55, 615–632, 1987.